Part 1 · 28 October 2025
More Than a Loss of Power
It has been a difficult month for Madagascar. On September 25th, youth-led protests erupted over power and water cuts: within days the government fell; within weeks, civil unrest became deadly. In the last few days, a coup d'état has ousted (now former) President Rajoelina, and stripped him of citizenship.
But why is a resource-rich nation unable to keep the lights on?
Beyond the Blackout: How Policy and Fossil Fuel Reliance Plunged Madagascar into Darkness
This week, we will discuss whether resource sovereignty - or overreliance - culminated in Madagascar's loss of power.
The Economic Development Board of Madagascar [1] note the nations' potential for mining ilmenite (titanium), gold, platinum group metals, copper, zinc, nickel, cobalt and chromite. However, most of the extractive industry is artisanal for semi-precious stones following years of neglect and distrust, born from the 2009 Coup which bought Rajoelina to power.
These resources are critical to renewable energy production, but they remain in the ground.
In 2023, Madagascar generated 65% of it's electricity from imported fossil fuels [2]
Since 2009, the drive in increasing energy production has been powered by Coal: increasing from 0% between 2000 and 2010; to 4.5-6% between 2011 and 2016; rising to 19% since 2017 (except 2020) [3].
Oil has seen a similar trend in Madagascar - as 35-40% of the energy share between 2000 and 2009; rising to 45-46% in 2010-11; gradually falling to 41% between 2012 and 2015; then becoming volatile between 2016 to 2023, peaking at over 50% in 2017 [3].
Question: has this growth been sustainable?
No.
Madagascar's reliance on fossil fuels has increased since 2009, the supply and cost have been exacerbated by external factors such as the war in Ukraine or Trump Tariffs.
Mineral fuels accounted for US$ 997.1 million of Magsaysay imports in 2023, as their top import accounting for 20.7% by dollar value [3].
JIRAMA, the state-owned energy and water company, is near bankrupt - unable to reliably pay it's suppliers, running on a deficit due to inefficient infrastructure, and is at the mercy of world event which it cannot control.
Energy dependance is not sovereignty. In fact, it is leverage for big players like China or the United States to offer support in return to favorable access to resources - on land or in the sea.
This is a policy failure - but also, a market failure. Read on in Part 2.
[1] https://edbm.mg/economic-data_sectors_mining-madagascar-land-of-hidden-treasures/
Part 2 · 12 November 2025
Power and Politics

Just 36% of Madagascar has access to electricity, only 23% of the country is supplied by it's national grid [1].
Last month, power and water outages led to civil unrest, and the fall of the Madagascan government - we have discussed how failures in policy since 2009 have led to Madagascar's overreliance on imported coal, which has jeopordised energy security.
"This is a policy failure - but, also a market failure"
In 2008/09, plans were well underway for the Ambatovy Cobalt and Nickel mine to be developed in Madagascar - supported by the European Investment Bank - however confidence was damaged during the 2009 Coup. While the project had been projected to start production in 2011 [2], commercial mining did not begin until 2014.
Furthermore, the government of Madagascar owns no stake in the Ambatovy Mine - the state's financial interest is limited to taxes and local expediture, accounting for 44 Million USD (2022) 340 Million USD (2023/4) respectively [3]. There are suggestions that Japan's Sumitomo Corperation have been looking to sell their 54.18% share in the mine since late 2024 [4].
These energy security minerals are processed, and shipped off to Japan and South Korea - while domestically, Madagascan Energy Security is in crisis.
Ready for the kicker?
Ambatovy run operations on their own diesel generators; and import their own coal, to fuel their own dedicated power plant [5]. They are completely isolated from the failings of the national grid - and government failings.
(Heathrow, are you taking notes?)
So why has the former government failed to secure, and invest in energy production? Random statistic time?
Madagascar only exploit 4% of their 7800 MW hyrdroelectic power potential [1]
Now, it would be easy to blame corruption, embezzlement, or incompetence - but the true cause, is systemic paralysis, smoke and mirrors.
Leading up to the 2023 "election", Madagascan politics were dominated by the Presidental Projects.
The Antananarivo Cable Car, a low-carbon, french-loan-funded €152 million vanity project - designed to allieveiate congestion in the capital city. We can add a little perspective here: in 2023, Opdenergy secured €128 million to finance five solar plants in Spain, with a combined output of 216 megawatts - over half of what Madagascar currently produces.
So why is there systemic paralysis? Why could that support not go into energy infrastructure? The answer is in two parts:
JIRAMA (the state owned energy and water agency) requires intervention or replacement. Replacing the national grid with smaller, privately funded, renewable power grids might be a way forward.
The second part is really quite stupid. Energy security, upgrading infrastructure, building resilience or contingency... isn't sexy. It's sensible.
It doesn't turn heads, or win votes - until it fails: then everyone notices.
Join us in Part 3, to discuss the "resource curse" - and what it really is...
[1] African Development Bank Group (2025) Madagascar Energy Factsheet. Available at:
https://www.afdb.org/en/mission-300-africa-energy-summit/accelerating-africas-energy-transition/madagascar-energy-factsheet
[2] US Department of State, (2011) 2011 Investment Climate Statement - Madagascar. Available at:
https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2011/157316.htm
[3] Randriamamonjy, I (2023) 'Mining Royalties - Ambatovy pays 198 billion ariary', L'Express de Madagascar. Available at:
https://lexpress.mg/11/07/2023/redevances-minieres-ambatovy-verse-198-milliards-ariary/
[4] Karr, L (2025) What the Madagascar Coup Means for Africa, Mining and Competition in the Indian Ocean: Africa File Special Edition. Critical Threats. Available at:
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/what-the-madagascar-coup-means-for-africa-mining-and-competition-in-the-indian-ocean-africa-file-special-edition#_edn10c13ff6c3cbf2b6d22cca917b0ac5ac39
[5] Ambatovy (2006) Environmental Assessment Ambatovy Project Summary. Available at:
https://ambatovy.com.en/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/volume-A-english.pdf
Part 3 · 27 November 2025
Is It “Resource Curse”?

I'm finding this article difficult to write. In part, because I think Resource Curse is a bullshit narrative to distract from crap policy - but also, because it is a little more nuanced than that.
Resource Curse is a hazard associated with economic overreliance. If the foundations of a system is built on one industry: when that industry fails, the whole system fails. And you may be surprised, that this is seen in more than just natural resources:
For example, the United Kingdom is a highly diversified economy - however, from the 1970s to the 2000s, the UK grew into a heavily skewed service sector economy. Financial and Insurance Services accounted for 8.8% of Gross Value Added in 2008. It was the engine of the British Economy, accounting for about 20% of export revenue.
Then, the global financial crisis hit. By 2009, the Gross Value Added had reduced by 1.4% or 22 billion pounds. I was in school, I remember my science teacher telling our class how our life prospects had become - futures died.
It took eight years for the trigger sector to recover. The UK Economy still feels the economic pain today - from trying to stay afloat - and that was just 8.8% of the economy.
So suppose instead your economy is built on mineral exports: in Madagascar, Nickel accounts for 18.1% of Exports; in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, cobalt and copper exports account for 80% of government revenue; in Chile, copper accounts for half of export revenue; in Peru, copper, gold and zinc account for 60% of export revenue.
The commoditization of resources makes these industries vulnerable, and therefore can compromise economies. It becomes a question of how can a nation control the market?
The DRC is interesting in this case, there is a huge contradiction. DRC do not include the proceeds of mining for their Gross Domestic Product - however, due to their monopoly over global Cobalt production, they were able to enforce a seven month export ban - to artificially raise value.
The DRC has the power to dictate global price for Cobalt, but lacks the policy to capture that value domestically - but why?
This question gets to the roots of resource curse: corruption, conflict, leakage and linkage.
Corruption - is it easy to see a shit deal, if you're winning? If you feel looked after, will you read the fine print? If accountability isn't there, what't the risk? If I don't agree, someone else will - it's not a game of goodies and baddies.
Conflict - the mining industry is sensitive, information is controlled: because the means of production of resources is leverage. Whether we discuss M23 controlling DRCs mines, the Taliban controlling Afghanistan's lithium, or private military contractors in Papua New Guinea - the risk of conflict is a barrier to transparency.
Leakage - the tight control of information allows mining operators to write the rules: for example, they can export ore at low value, then process and realise the value more tax-favourable nations. The developing state still gets their tax and export duties, being short changed by their own rules.
Linkage - let's consider Ambatovy once more: they source their own fuel, operate their own power stations; opeate their own port - the lack of linkage between mining and the wider economy is similar to the UK's predicament. Focusing the economy on the City of London, without being a catalyst for the remainder of the economy presents something we has dicussed before.
The single point of failure.
Remember the Heathrow substation? One fire, international consequnces.
When you build your economy, your system, your supply chain - on one pillar, it is as much of a vunerability as it is an asset.
So what is the answer? It feels like I stress the word diversification over and over again - maybe I overrely on it.
Building in redundacy and resilience is key, it is much the same story for the supply of critical minerals (or energy transition minerals)
But if you are worried about resource curse, here is a thought to take away:
Passive taxation is not enough. You need a seat at the table, and a vested interest - that means you need to ensure soverignty over your resources.
It feels like the top of the new Magalsay agenda should be to revisit the previous governments agreements - with soverignty in mind. Or, to leverage their resource for support in green electrification.
The energy tranisition is critical, and resource rich nations - many of whom are resource rich - must be respected, and partners in this global revolution.
